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ASSESSING UKRAINE’S VICTIM 
ASSISTANCE CAPACITIES
By Kateryna Mashchenko, Tetiana Shymanchuk, Oleh Stoiev, and Nick Vovk 
[ Danish Refugee Committee-Danish Demining Group ]
S
ix years into the protracted crisis, explosive ordnance (EO) 
contamination continues to affect Ukrainian communities. 
Consequent to the conflict between the government of Ukraine 
and the so-called de facto authorities in the Donetsk and Luhansk 
regions, EO affects an estimated 7,000 square kilometers of land in 
government-controlled areas (GCAs).1 Even without complete data 
from the non-government-controlled areas (NGCAs), Ukraine ranks 
among the five most affected places in the world for EO casualties.2 
But for EO victims3 the path forward remains fraught with difficul-
ties. According to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS),4 
victim assistance (VA) requires a long-term commitment, a responsi-
bility that state institutions bear. The present article, encapsulating an 
assessment conducted in 2018 and 2019,5 highlights the crucial inca-
pacities of the primary VA duty-bearers in Ukraine and puts forth the 
corresponding lessons learned.
The needs of child EO victims are at the center of our analyses 
of local VA capacities. Danish Refugee Council-Danish Demining 
Group’s (DRC-DDG) internal database6 shows 2,060 casualties (result-
ing from 1,126 incidents) from June 2014 to September 2020; 151 of 
these were children. Picking up, tampering with, and playing with 
EO—behaviors characteristic of children—is the third most frequent 
known cause of EO casualties in Ukraine. Children from poverty-
stricken regions are regularly attracted to EO in order to sell them 
for scrap metal or souvenirs.7 The impact of hostilities on educational 
infrastructure remains on the rise: some fifty conflict-related incidents 
have been reported in 2019. When compared to 2018, this constitutes 
a nearly 200 percent rise.8 The presence of military forces within a 
1-kilometer radius of educational facilities as well as the infrastruc-
tural destruction caused by the ongoing conflict forces some children 
to cross the EO-ridden contact line every day to attend classes.9 
Although full clearance is years away, Ukraine is making tangible 
progress. It has joined important mine action- and VA-related conven-
tions and ensures basic rights to its population through its constitu-
tion (and related social protection laws).10 Ukraine has also adopted the 
Law of Ukraine “On Mine Action,” hereinafter referred to as the mine 
action law (MAL), on 6 December 2018. Ukrainian Parliament has 
recently adopted an amendment to MAL (Draft Law No. 2618, adopted 
on 17 September 2020). However, as of December 2020, it has not yet 
been signed by the President of Ukraine.11 To a certain extent, inter-
agency communication and coordination on VA exist with social pro-
tection units, sanatoriums, rehabilitation centers, and regional-level 
hospitals currently serving as essential VA intermediaries. Ukraine is 
also steadily implementing the state-wide inclusion reform (i.e., “The 
New Ukrainian School”), improving access to education for children 
with special educational needs. Finally, the government is open to and 
cooperative with the international mine action community. As a result, 
DRC-DDG was able to holistically assess the remaining VA gaps.
The assessment took international policies and guidelines as the 
theoretical background for its research. These included the UN 
Policy on Victim Assistance in Mine Action12 and the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) Guidance on Child Focused Victim 
Assistance.13 DRC-DDG used these as a framework for the design 
of the assessment, thereby covering the following topics: laws and 
policies, data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, 
Child EO victim in Svatove, Luhansk region.
Image courtesy of © UNICEF / Filippov / 2019.
Background image: Child EO victim in Svatove, Luhansk region.
Image courtesy of © UNICEF / Filippov / 2019.
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more in-depth study was beyond reach. The lack of a nationally-
owned, EO-casualty database additionally hampered the iden-
tification of potential interviewees. Regardless, the DRC-DDG 
assessment—supported by the German government and United 
Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF)—continues to 
be the only review of national Ukrainian VA capacities.
GAPS IN UKRAINIAN NATIONAL VA CAPACITIES
Laws and Policies. The root cause for many VA incapacities 
emerges from the underdeveloped legal environment. For any 
national provision, governments are required to adopt necessary 
laws, secure budgets, and develop policies, regulations, and pro-
cedures. For VA in Ukraine, this is yet to become the case. For 
years, the Ukrainian response remained ad hoc, uncoordinated, 
and misaligned with best practices from abroad. Not until late 
2018, did the government adopt MAL;19 as of December 2020, its 
implementation remains troublesome. For VA, two significant 
challenges exist in the Ukrainian legal framework: unenforced 
existing provisions and gaps within them. 
The current version of MAL provides for a number of services 
to EO victims but lacks the crucial legal documents, by-laws, and 
procedures for its implementation. For instance, MAL secures 
rights to medical, psychological, professional, and social assistance 
for all EO victims;20 however, there is no complex system or pro-
tocol for the general provision of VA at the state level.21 Officials 
are obliged to act exclusively as defined by national regulations.22 
Thus, EO victims either receive assistance at the discretion of local 
administrations, or simply do not. Many crucial legal documents 
(e.g., a national mine action strategy) are also missing. Finally, by-
laws (i.e., procedures, orders, and directions) required to provide a 
framework for a national mine action authority and national mine 
action center are absent. Crucial gaps in the existing legislation are 
likewise commonplace. 
Even where the current MAL is implemented and necessary pro-
cedures are adopted, certain gaps weaken the state’s VA capabilities. 
For one, there is no provision on data collection. Unless defined in 
MAL, such data collection is both legally controversial and halts the 
coordination of responsible state bodies. Furthermore, MAL does not 
prescribe the adoption of a national mine action strategy or an action 
plan; without these, national VA is undermined. What is more, the 
state allocated a budget line for mine action activities only in 2019 
and 2020 (approximately US$185,000). While a separate line on “spe-
cialized assistance on prosthetics and rehabilitation” (approximately 
US$1 million) was included, it is insufficient for the needs of the ben-
eficiaries. Such a lagging legal environment is the common theme for 
many of the national VA capacity gaps discussed next.
Data Collection. The problematic EO casualty data collection is 
not limited to Ukraine as mirrored by examples in countries such as 
Afghanistan,23 Bosnia and Herzegovina,24 and Vietnam.25 Similarly, 
the establishment of a reliable and complete EO casualty data col-
lection system in Ukraine is in process. Currently, Ukraine has 
no central agency in charge of the latter, neither is it mentioned in 
MAL. The state capacity to evaluate the scope of required assistance 
Figure 1. Accumulated Data on VA Assessment in Ukraine.
Figure courtesy of © DRC-DDG.
rehabilitation, psychological and psycho-social support, and socioeco-
nomic inclusion (focusing on education). For this article, we found it 
pertinent to also share drawbacks and lessons learned about conduct-
ing VA assessments. Finally, we have adjusted the terminology of the 
article to conform with IMAS 13.10 Victim Assistance (First Edition), 
published earlier in 2020.14 
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS
The two-stage assessment employed a mixed-method research 
approach, including secondary data analyses as well as qualitative and 
quantitative research tools. In the first stage (2018), the team used a 
questionnaire (with multiple choice, open-ended, yes/no, and Likert-
type questions)15 for household interviews with parents or caregivers of 
child EO victims and semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs) 
for institutional VA stakeholders. Although difficult to locate EO vic-
tims due to stigma, fear, and the lack of a database recording casualty 
data, snowball sampling16 was used to reach fifteen parents or caregivers 
of seventeen child EO victims (from one to seventeen years old) while 
duty-bearing VA service providers (n = 52) were gathered from three 
levels: national, regional, and local.17 For triangulation, secondary data 
analyses were performed using institutional and internal DRC-DDG 
sources as well as a desk review of related reports from other humanitar-
ian and development organizations. The second stage (2019) focused on 
national educational capacities for child EO victims. Here, too, house-
hold and KIIs were utilized to contact fifty-four interviewees (twelve 
children, twenty-two teachers, and twenty caregivers) using a purposive 
sampling18 (see Figure 1). For both stages, the two regions of Luhansk 
and Donetsk were chosen due to the frequency of child EO accidents (see 
Figure 2). Although the assessment aimed to be comprehensive, certain 
limitations are noteworthy.
Capacity assessment was constrained by timeframes and wide geo-
graphical spread, availability and quality of data, as well as demograph-
ics. Each stage of the assessment lasted for three months; however, 
the conflict-affected areas stretch over 427 kilometers. The nature of a 
small-sized team, as well as safety and logistical issues, meant that a 
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Figure 2. Reported child EO casualties in Ukraine (June 2014 - September 2020).
Figure courtesy of © DRC-DDG.
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is further thwarted by the fact that healthcare facilities did not iden-
tify EO injuries under the International Classification of Diseases26 
at the onset of the conflict (only in 2018 was a protocol introduced 
obliging them to do so). As a result, EO victims injured before 2018 
face difficulties proving the cause of injury when trying to obtain sup-
port. Without a comprehensive victim information system (VIS), it is 
likewise impossible to accurately quantify the cost of conflict-related 
disabilities to individuals, the economy, and society at large. The state 
is hence not only limited in ensuring compensation and assistance for 
the current EO victims but also in accurately evaluating VA needs for 
the future.
Emergency and Continuing Medical Care. While emergency care 
is oftentimes provided at local and district levels, it is the expense of 
continued medical care and a lack of specialists and equipment that 
remain problematic and disproportionately affect rural areas. The 
majority of interviewed victims requiring continuing medical care had 
to transfer to regional hospitals; lacking external support, many EO 
victims and their families continue to struggle with such transitions. 
Moreover, there exists a general shortage of specialists and equipment 
to treat EO-related traumas in conflict-affected regions. In some of the 
assessed cases, this led to errors in treatment and the deterioration of 
victims’ conditions. But as noted by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), for the EO victims and their families it is currently “impos-
sible to assess the quality and capacity of medical facilities in Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions because of subjective perceptions of quality.” The 
biggest deficiencies have been identified in rural areas due to the long 
distances that need to be travelled to access adequate medical facili-
ties. This is further exacerbated by the fact that most EO accidents in 
Ukraine occur in rural areas among a population that is more eco-
nomically fragile.27
Rehabilitation. Rehabilitation in Ukraine has gaps in individual 
planning, full-cycle prosthetic provision, informational awareness, 
and state-assigned budgeting. All EO victims with physical disabilities 
interviewed received an individual rehabilitation plan (IRP), inform-
ing them of access to rehabilitation facilities and prosthetic services. 
Yet, these plans have rarely been made concrete in practice. EO victims 
also faced difficulties receiving relevant rehabilitation due to omis-
sions or inaccuracies in IRPs. Thus, no interviewed EO victim was 
availed the full cycle of prostheses: preparation, adjustments, main-
tenance, and replacement. The procedures for obtaining such assistive 
devices are not interlinked. As a result, prostheses provided to chil-
dren are exclusively cosmetic rather than functional. While functional 
prostheses would provide children with increased mobility, they are 
more costly and require periodic changes. Their provision and appli-
cation is also highly specialized and tailored. Fitting would require 
multiple trips to regional hospitals, making it even more inaccessible 
for low-income families. Additionally, a reluctance among social pro-
tection specialists to fully inform families of rehabilitation services is 
customary due to a lack of funding. “If the government aims to save 
money, there will obviously be less incentives to inform families of 
the available services,” stated an interviewed child protection expert. 
Finally, state funding for the rehabilitation of children is limited. As 
reported by social protection specialists, the amount provided by the 
government is normally enough to cover one rehabilitation session 
annually; however, a child usually needs four. 
Psychological and Psycho-Social Support. Ukrainian child EO 
victims are not supported by an established system of psychological 
aid or qualified professionals, with distrust for such services preva-
lent among the population. While MAL asserts rights to psychologi-
cal and social aid to every EO victim, the majority of them fall short 
of its full extent. Of the seventeen assessed cases, only eight received 
psychological support. It was rendered either as generic psychological 
assistance or therapy at a hospital, emergency psychological counsel-
ling post-accident, or as psychological therapy in sanatoriums during 
rehabilitation, at their schools, or by a non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO). Without an established system of psychological aid, reha-
bilitation and other psycho-social assistances are provided solely from 
local resources. As expressed during our interviews with national and 
international NGOs and governmental stakeholders, the latter lack 
the requisite professional capabilities, as most psychologists operating 
in eastern Ukraine do not have experience in counselling trauma and 
are uncertain of their ability to provide such counseling. A further 
problem is the distrust of psychological counselling, caused by both 
the underestimation of psychological risks and burdens as well as the 
costs of such services. It is, therefore, common for families (as well as 
doctors, teachers, and social workers) to be prejudiced against psy-
chological assistance, underreport their need for it, and reluctantly 
recognize it as a priority. “He became more reserved and aggressive 
… No, we are not going to contact a psychologist, we do not need it,” 
mentioned one mother.
Socioeconomic Inclusion. The assessment focused particularly 
on the educational environment to identify gaps in child EO victims’ 
socioeconomic inclusion. While most of child EO victims continued 
with education within one-to-three months after the incident (30 per-
cent and 25 percent of interviewees, respectively), those with more 
severe injuries had to drop out due to ongoing medical care for at least 
six months to more than a year. Some children faced additional diffi-
culties in their learning due to loss of skills as a result of severe traumas 
or amputations. Likewise, legislation remains to be fully implemented 
providing children with disabilities the same opportunity as their 
peers without disabilities. Despite a state-wide inclusion reform in the 
educational system, teachers from conflict-affected areas still reported 
a lack of knowledge, skills, and information on working with children 
with disabilities and no relevant training on inclusion in schools. 
Consequently, teaching staff and administrators are sometimes not 
ready or unwilling to include children with disabilities in their classes. 
Moreover, there are few (extracurricular) activities for child EO vic-
tims due to the absence of afterschool activities at schools, generally, 
and the lack of conditions and accessible facilities for children with 
disabilities, specifically.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VA CAPACITY BUILDING 
IN UKRAINE
Laws and Policies. Improving the legal environment for VA will 
necessitate amending MAL and its corresponding legal documents, 
assigning an evidence-based budget, and bolstering the legal support 
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to the state. Functional changes to MAL include, inter alia, develop-
ing a legal status for EO victims, introducing the necessary procedures 
at all VA stages, and establishing specialized state bodies to lead the 
national VA response.28 More data-driven budget allocations would 
also be crucial. Lastly, it would be beneficial to dedicate adequate 
resources to legal VA (and mine action) capacities within the gov-
ernment to identify further gaps in legislation and help develop the 
required legal acts. 
Data Collection. There is an acute need to put into place a stan-
dardized and centralized collection of EO casualty data given the 
many issues that arise from its absence. For this, a state policy should 
be developed and integrated with clear terms and with a distribution of 
responsibilities among the relevant stakeholders—as is the case in, for 
example, Cambodia. Such a database should be sex, age, and disability 
disaggregated, including causes of injuries and incidents from earlier 
stages of the conflict. It is important to include data on incidents that 
have taken place in NGCAs to ensure that victims have access to assis-
tance in GCAs. As a result, it would be possible to amalgamate, verify, 
and report on the incident data via a centralized database and populate 
a VIS. Statistical information from such a national database should be 
available upon request to all relevant mine action and VA stakeholders. 
This will help better identify EO victims, assess the complexity and 
extent of VA needs, and aid further analyses.
Emergency and Continuing Medical 
Care. Emergency and continuing medical 
care for EO victims in Ukraine requires 
capacity building of medical staff, supervi-
sion of EO victims, and allocation of funds 
for travel expenses. To boost the specialist 
knowledge of doctors, a coordinated plan 
for their capacity enhancements ought to 
be developed and implemented. Training 
will need to be registered and monitored for 
refreshment and assessment of continued 
needs. Since families tend to put less prior-
ity into continued medical care, individual 
supervision of EO victims by medical staff is 
highly recommended. Medical staff should 
be aware of cases where ongoing treatment 
is required, and efforts should be made on 
both sides (caregivers and medical insti-
tutions) to ensure that child EO victims 
receive all necessary care. Due to frequent 
long-distance travel required for continu-
ing treatments, the allocation of state funds 
could bring much-needed financial relief to 
EO victims and their families.
Rehabilitation. In terms of reha-
bilitation, we recommend an improved, 
full-cycled, tailor-made, and needs-
based VA system. The current model5 
should be replaced by an improved ver-
sion in the provision, care, and main-
tenance of prostheses, aligned with international 
experience and featuring a broader array of technologies. Furthermore, 
a full-cycle, coordinated methodology for the registration and follow- 
on care of EO victims ought to be put into place and linked with 
records from other types of assistance provided (i.e., psycho-social, 
financial). The rehabilitation for EO victims also needs to be personal-
ized. Patients should be supported from the initial injury all the way 
through recovery to exiting the system. A dedicated case manager 
should act as a focal point for each family so the process is streamlined 
and lessens the burden on the EO victims. Finally, EO victims need 
to receive equal prioritization for treatment as those injured by other 
means: support should be needs- rather than cause-based. 
Psychological and Psycho-Social Support. Psychological and 
psycho-social support requires coordination, governmental strategies, 
awareness raising and advocacy, as well as a needs-based approach. 
Lessons learned from other countries29 would be useful in developing 
a coordinated support system for EO victims in Ukraine. A dedicated 
governmental strategy and an allocated budget would ensure access to 
higher quality psychological treatment. To counteract the reluctance 
for this support, more awareness raising and advocacy of its impor-
tance in the post-traumatic treatment process should be garnered 
among national duty-bearers (especially schools in eastern Ukraine) 
and the general public. Lastly, ongoing counselling and psychological 
Child EO victim in Svatove, Luhansk region.
Image courtesy of © UNICEF / Filippov / 2019.
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support for EO victims should be identified as part of the overall 
rehabilitation and social inclusion plan for each victim and regularly 
reviewed throughout their path to recovery. 
Socioeconomic Inclusion. The four main recommendations for 
improvements in the social and economic inclusion of EO victims 
are special approaches to education, capacity building of teachers, 
disability-centered extracurricular activities, and awareness raising. It 
is necessary to specify the particular learning objectives for EO victims 
comparative to their peers without disabilities; to establish individual 
training or online learning during their treatment; and to ensure their 
greater involvement in programs befitting their needs, including voca-
tional assistance to enhance their employability. Since the response of 
teachers to the needs of EO victims fundamentally affects the qual-
ity of education and the environment at schools, supporting programs 
(such as inclusion training) for teachers and children ought to be 
implemented to build their technical and practical capacities. Regular 
awareness raising for parents, children, communities, and state rep-
resentatives to broaden their knowledge on appropriate attitudes 
towards children with disabilities would also be beneficial. “People on 
the bus would avert their eyes upon seeing them so my children asked 
me to buy them balaclavas,” explained a parent of child EO victims. 
For the conflict-affected Donetsk and Luhansk regions, further efforts 
are likewise required in the development of specialized extracurricular 
programs as well as sporting and recreational facilities for EO victims 
and other people with disabilities.
CONCLUSION: FUTURE VA ASSESSMENTS
 Taking into account various international policies and guidelines, 
the assessment of Ukraine’s VA looked at (1) gaps in the underpinning 
legal environment, (2) data collection, (3) emergency and continuing 
medical care, (4) rehabilitation, (5) psychological and psycho-social 
support, (6) and socioeconomic inclusion. However, given the limita-
tions of the present assessment, more in-depth studies are recom-
mended for particular segments of VA in the future. For example, it 
would be pertinent to assess the socioeconomic impact of accidents on 
child EO victims. The formative years in which child EO victims expe-
rience the incidents call for the identification of educational, career, 
and life prospects of children post-accident. Moreover, a more detailed 
look at the psychological impact of the armed conflict on the entire 
social strata would inform VA specialists how to better address 
psycho-social and psychological consequences. A further inquiry into 
the rehabilitation, prosthesis, and orthotics systems is likewise deemed 
key, especially for alignment with IMAS on VA (including physiother-
apy, assistive devices, and occupational and speech therapy). 
Additionally, we recognize that future assessments of medical capaci-
ties ought to be conducted by medically-qualified personnel and 
benchmarked against good practices as illustrated elsewhere. 
See endnotes page 66
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